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How can the U.S. 
criminal justice system 
deal with crimes of such 
magnitude?  Was it 
intended to do so? 
 
 
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:   
FROM MAYBERRY TO MOSCOW 
Kim R. Lindquist* 
 
 In early 1993, I sat with the FBI Hostage Rescue 
Team outside the sprawling compound of religious fanatic, 
David Koresh, at Waco, Texas.  I was clad in a helmet and 
bullet-proof vest, and equipped with a prosecutor’s pen and 
notepad.  My police officer companions were dressed and 
armed as soldiers; the compound was a sandbag fortification.  
Overhead, helicopters were flying angrily. 
 That immediate situation came to a devastating 
conclusion a few days later with a violent mass death, 
tragically mirroring the previous loss of several law 
enforcement officers just a few days prior at the same 
compound. 
 I remember finding it difficult to remember that I was 
on American soil, and even more challenging to recognize the 
situation as a law enforcement operation as opposed to war. 
 From U.S. tragedies borne of 
fanaticism, such as Waco, Ruby Ridge, 
the civil and drug trade wars of South 
America’s Colombia, Paraguay, 
Argentina and Brazil, and ultimately to 
the killing grounds of Chechnya, 
Palestine, Israel, and Moscow, we see a 
continuum that runs from law 
enforcement to war and back again. 
Crime and war are two relative 
extremes on a normative, procedural and moral spectrum 
along which criminal justice systems and military authorities 
now struggle to function. 
 I had the same horrible, sinking feeling when I 
watched the video replay of the airliners flying into the Twin 
Towers of New York City.  I tried to contemplate the social 
context that gave rise to such a heinous and massive event of 
hate, death, and destruction, and how the criminal justice 
system would deal with it.  Since then, that context, including 
its essence of religious fanaticism, has manifested itself more 
clearly, only confirming anxiety and fears regarding a criminal 
justice system’s ability to address the situation.    
 How can the U.S. criminal justice system deal with 
crimes of such magnitude? Was it intended to do so?  Is our 
system being ordered to march into realms where it was never 
intended to go? 
 My purpose in writing this is not to make excuses for 
criminal justice systems or their functionaries. We are facing a 
cultural crime phenomenon that is bigger than, and threatens 
to go beyond, the historically intended reach of the traditional 
criminal justice system.  
 Are these the social issues criminal justice systems 
were developed to address and resolve?  If not, can these 
systems evolve, or be modified, to encompass these 
horrendous modern novelties?  
 On one end of the spectrum is the local law 
enforcement scenario, represented (as shown hereafter) by the 
fictional town of Mayberry from the Andy Griffith show.  
Although Mayberry is a Hollywood invention set in the 
American South, it nonetheless is fairly representative of the 
historical, social context that gave rise to the traditional U.S. 
criminal justice system. 
 On the other end of the spectrum is the war scenario, 
illustrated vividly by the Waco incident or the 2002 Moscow 
theater hostage crisis, where Chechen rebels who took over 
700 hostages were killed when Russian 
government officers raided the building. 
 In the Mayberry, or law enforcement 
scenario, we have a law enforcement response to a 
relatively isolated and local event.  This response 
prompts, and in fact requires, a procedural 
resolution that attempts to balance accountability 
with fairness and freedom in the local crucible of 
justice. 
 This law enforcement crucible necessarily 
consists of several components that are particular to 
jurisdiction, specifically investigation, formal reception of 
evidence and judgment, which reveal themselves in legal 
codes or rules.  These rules proscribe criminal behavior, 
control investigative techniques, establish procedural 
requirements, and provide for the manner of evidence 
reception in judgment.     
 On the other hand, as epitomized in the Moscow 
theater siege, we have the event of mass and indiscriminate 
killing and destruction of property in magnified violation of a 
moral norm.  Sometimes it is a threat to the very existence of a 
given culture or society, considering the mass destruction now 
made feasible by modern technology. 
 This event tends to exceed local boundaries and, 
more often than not, invokes foreign and extra-territorial 
considerations.   
 
The Law Enforcement Scenario 
 
 The killing of a single human being is part of the law 
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enforcement scenario.  The local applicable criminal code 
would proscribe such behavior.  Other related local rules 
regarding the arrest of persons and the search for and seizure 
of evidence, the procedural process, and the manner of 
reception of pertinent evidence by the local trier of the facts in 
judgment would similarly apply.  Moreover, in this local law 
enforcement scenario, the accused violator would necessarily 
be entitled to, and the justice system would promote and 
sustain, certain protections or rights created by the same local, 
cultural context giving rise to the morality-based normative 
proscription.  
 The development and maintenance of a law abiding 
citizenry historically came from four primary institutions: the 
family, the school, the church and the community at large. 
These institutions largely determined the behavioral norms, 
and, more importantly, instill obedience to those norms.  
Families nurture. They are supported and sustained by school 
teachers and administrators, religious leaders and other 
community components, such as employers, all to ensure 
successive generations of law abiding citizens.   
 Mayberry, and specifically the role of the local 
sheriff Andy Taylor, is an example of this historical approach 
to law enforcement.  In Mayberry, families, schools, church 
and the community at large were viable and strong in raising 
widowed Andy’s son, Opie Taylor, to be a good and law-
abiding young man.  Indeed, Andy’s role as father was more 
of a theme in the television show than his role as law 
enforcing sheriff.  Even when he locked up Otis, the town 
drunk, he did so less as a police officer and more as a 
community mentor.  As sheriff, he represented the criminal 
justice system in Mayberry, symbolized by his uniform, but 
rarely did he carry a gun.  He didn’t have to, because those 
institutions most responsible for civilizing the next generation 
were, for the most part, doing their job.  On rare occasions, a 
bad guy would reveal himself and Andy would don a gun and 
apply the criminal justice system more aggressively; but he 
did so reluctantly, as a matter of duty rather than social 
preference.  Barney, the deputy, with an eager gun in his 
holster and a single bullet in his front shirt pocket, served as 
Andy’s character foil and perhaps a comedic precursor to 
“Rambo.” 
 In this social context, the criminal justice system was 
designed as a secondary and reactionary mechanism.  It was 
never intended as the or even a primary civilizing entity. It 
emerged as a safety net for the occasional, individual fall, not 
the circus tent that constantly covered the entire community. 
 Mayberry, Andy Taylor and the criminal justice 
picture they portray are not just Hollywood fiction.  They have 
existed and can yet exist in both rural and urban settings.  
However, they are lamentably rare today, lost in the tragic 
wake of pervasive social abdication by those most responsible.  
Parents today are distracted from their unequaled 
responsibilities either by the complacency of materialism and 
affluence, the degrading reality of poverty, or the ambivalent 
middle ground.  Legal repercussions force teachers to abandon 
their moral influence in favor of important but colder 
academics.  Religious leaders find their message and outreach 
marginalized more every day.  In addition, too infrequently 
nowadays does the profit-minded employer perceive any 
obligation to a struggling youth.  These four primary civilizing 
institutions have either abdicated outright their social 
responsibility or simply lost influence through misguided 
social orientation. 
 The inevitable and now immediate and pervasive 
result of this social abdication is twofold.  First, a civilizing 
agent vacancy or void is created. Secondly, there is a dramatic 
increase in uncivilized behavior, in crime, to such a degree 
that it constitutes a primary threat to society. Hence, the 
absolute need for law abidingness and a civilizing agent has 
not waned.  Indeed, it is more cogent than ever. 
 
The War Scenario 
 
 The Geneva Convention comes to mind when 
considering the war scenario. The war scenario lends itself to, 
and even instigates, the creation of alternative, international-
type forums, where violations of such magnitude and nature 
are addressed.  International criminal tribunals are an example. 
 The subject matter of the same is described in terms 
of “genocide” and “crimes against humanity.”  This 
international judicial alternative might very well bear on the 
solution to the dilemma that is posed with regard to a given 
national criminal justice system.  To date, however, it has 
neither resolved the dichotomy tension nor relieved that 
national system of normative and procedural responsibility 
with regard to the phenomenon of terrorism as the incubator of 
a war scenario; it probably never will.   
 From the perspective of the U.S. and other national 
criminal justice systems and their respective reaches and 
responsibilities, with September 11 and related terrorist 
events, the systems have moved to effectively encompass war 
scenarios. 
 
A Role Confused  
 
 So where do we now turn in dealing with society-
threatening crime and for that essential, but now largely 
absent, civilizing agent?  What is our social recourse?  
 Unfortunately, societies look errantly for alternative 
institutions and find an unsuited and unwilling but very 
available and deceptively accommodating criminal justice 
system to address both aspects. 
 Conceptually, the criminal justice system is meant to 
deal with crime any way it presents itself.  Crime has become 
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a fundamental threat to our society.  We, in frustration, 
desperation or calculated and irresponsible misapplication, 
confuse the limited and reactive role of the criminal justice 
system with that of a primary, affirmative, civilizing agent and 
blindly task the courts to fill that void. 
The crime phenomenon and the 
misguided social engineering 
associated with it have simply 
surpassed the capabilities of a socially 
limited and fragile system. 
 From the parent telling the judge, “It’s your job to 
deal with my wayward child;” to the 
attorney general of an entire country 
querying, “If your criminal justice 
system is so good, why do you have 
so much crime?” we all look too 
frequently to the courts to solve our 
social ills. 
 That system, however, was 
never designed to fulfill such a role.  As I tell my aspiring 
criminal justice students, by entering this profession you are 
largely being set up to fail, with the profession taking a 
personal toll through alcoholism and other problems. Society 
demands of the system and its people what they were never 
intended to provide.  Criminal justice functionaries, by their 
inherent institutional nature, are reactive, systemic technicians, 
not affirmative civilizing agents. 
 More specifically, police officers are primarily 
enforcers of law and discoverers of facts, not nurturing 
employers. Prosecutors are legal advisors, accusers and formal 
presenters of discovered facts, not socially assigned moral 
teachers of youth. Judges are overseers, referees, evaluators of 
discovered facts and interpreters of established law, not 
parents to defendants. Defense attorneys are protectors, 
scrutinizers and challengers, not community clerics. 
 The dramatic increase in crime means that the 
hallmark, localized, individual criminal event, the basis of the 
“law enforcement scenario,” has expanded and multiplied to 
such a degree as to destroy the procedural significance of that 
individuality and locality, thereby approaching analytically a 
“war scenario.”  The practical reality of this phenomenon is 
confirmed by expressions such as “the war on crime,” and “the 
drug wars.” 
 As an example of the transition from individual crime 
to a war scenario, drug trafficking, with all the violence and 
social destruction associated with it, has taken on an invasive 
complexion with law enforcement and the criminal justice 
system waging pitched battles against it around the world. 
 
SWAT team versus the Beat Cop 
 
 Further manifestation of the criminal justice system’s 
hapless transition from localized single crime to war scenario 
is seen in the militaristic orientation and development of law 
enforcement entities.  A SWAT team is deemed more 
pertinent and desirable than a neighborhood patrol.  The beat 
cop has given way to Rambo. 
 This expanded law enforcement scenario results in 
two questionable products: a criminal justice system that can’t 
reactively handle the crime increase within its designed 
parameters, and a criminal justice system that is additionally 
and impossibly tasked with affirmative social civilizing. 
 The crime phenomenon and the misguided social 
engineering associated with it 
have simply surpassed the 
capabilities of a socially limited 
and fragile system. 
 With recent terrorism 
events, the transition from a local 
crime scenario to a war scenario 
seems confirmed.  From the 
investigative, charging and judging perspective of the criminal 
justice system, September 11 and the Moscow theater takeover 
are more akin to Pearl Harbor than they are to a local murder 
prosecution.  If the system struggles or fails in handling an 
expanded law enforcement scenario, it truly constitutes an 
impossible mission as to the war scenario. 
 In law enforcement, terrorism is perhaps even more 
challenging and elusive for the criminal justice system as a 
war scenario than that represented by the classic invading 
army. 
 Jihadist or extreme Islam-based terrorism, for 
example, is truly an ephemeral, stateless nation of individuals 
linked by a common, fanatical religious ideology.  Whether 
dealing with the infiltration of America and its infrastructure 
by actual Islamist suicide killers or by Jihadist ideology in 
material support of violence world-wide, many countries of 
the world are truly in a terrorism war scenario. 
 It largely is being fought, however, with historical 
and traditional law enforcement scenario tools, and is 
struggling as a result.  If those tools are inadequate in an 
expanded law enforcement or local crime scenario, they are 
even more wanting in this terrorism war scenario. 
 Consider the extensive investigation and trial last 
year of the Saudi student at the University of Idaho in 
Moscow, Idaho.  He used his computer to publicize online 
Islamist recruitment and funding of overt and material support 
of terrorist activities.  After more than two months of trial 
testimony, a jury in Boise, Idaho acquitted the defendant of 
some charges and hung on the rest.  Once again, without 
making individual or institutional excuses, this criminal justice 
result might very well be explained in part at least by the law 
enforcement scenario-based criminal justice system failing to 
function in a war scenario. 
 First, the defendant used his computer in the United 
States to publish and post on the world-wide Internet Jihadist 
material that had the express purpose of promoting, funding 
and recruiting for terrorism in Russia and Palestine.  Since the 
case dealt with something that exceeded the essentially local, 
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domestic nature of a law enforcement scenario, the 
prosecution was forced to fashion, in accordance with the 
available statutory charging tools, a complex series of three 
conspiracy statutes interwoven into one charge.  Given that the 
various applicable statutes went into effect at different times, 
the charging document had to combine the general conspiracy 
statute of 18 U.S.C. Section 371 with the material support 
conspiracy statute of 18 U.S.C. Section 2339A in order to 
charge the foundational, local jurisdiction material support 
conspiracy.  The object of that foundational conspiracy, in 
addition to the material support components which also varied 
in application over time, was yet another conspiracy statute, 
18 U.S.C. Section 956, which allowed extra-territorial 
application, but with jurisdictional ties to the United States.  In 
short, the prosecution had to charge a domestic conspiracy 
which, in turn, included a foreign conspiracy, the purpose of 
both being the commission of terrorist acts abroad. 
 
One must wonder if Clint 
Eastwood as Dirty Harry didn’t 
also have this situation well in 
mind when he said that “[e]very 
good man recognizes his 
limitations.” 
 
 Although every good litigator must pride herself or 
himself in being a teacher first and lawyer a very distant 
second, it was extremely difficult for 
the prosecutors to teach the jury this 
legal and factual disconnect. The 
prosecutors even had to constantly 
revisit and confirm their own 
understanding of the legal basis in 
relation to the facts. One can only 
imagine what it was like, then, for the 
jury to grasp and meaningfully apply 
the same. 
 Furthermore, the court 
imposed, as directive to the jury, a freedom of speech norm 
that effectively precluded conviction absent a finding that 
“speech [was] directed to inciting or promoting imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite and promote such action. . 
. .”  (Italics added).  Without advocating that freedom of 
speech has no application whatsoever to ideological 
expression and the material support of terrorism—which the 
author does not espouse—the criticism lies in the legal fact 
that such requires proof that ideological expression must 
imminently incite or promote terrorism.  Jihadist indoctrination 
is not only psychologically powerful, but it is patient and 
persevering in its social manifestation.  From the standpoint of 
“imminence,” prompting a person by means of Islamist 
language to donate to the violence of Hamas in Palestine, or to 
go to a training camp to prepare for the commission of violent 
acts in Chechnya or in a Moscow theater, it is a far cry from 
yelling “Fire!” in that same crowded theater.  Yet, the local 
law enforcement-based norms were nonetheless applied to the 
extraterritorial, war scenario facts.  
 The jury was asked to consider a factual scenario that 
had virtually nothing to do with their locality save the 
defendant and his computer being temporarily situated there.  
Beyond that meager nexus, it was as if the trial were taking 
place in Central Asia and the Middle East, with its very 
strange geography, demographics, language, culture and 
religious ideology.  Getting the typical Christian from 
comfortably aloof Boise, Idaho to comprehend Arab-based 
Jihadist violence as manifested in Grozny, Chechnya or 
Moscow, Russia, and as materially supported by a Wahhabi-
educated Saudi using a computer in Moscow, Idaho, was 
asking much of them within the necessarily limited social 
confines of a criminal trial.   
 Once again, one is loathe to even suggest that there is 
material of whatever nature that a capable litigator cannot 
teach a jury once he or she comes to understand it, but one 
must wonder if Clint Eastwood as Dirty Harry didn’t also have 
this situation well in mind when he said that “[e]very good 
man recognizes his limitations.” 
 During approximately the same period of time in 
which the federal criminal court in Idaho struggled to 
accommodate this foreign terrorism case, a local Iraqi Muslim 
was prosecuted in Idaho state court for 
the arson murder of his wife, a Muslim 
convert. 
 The defense in that state case 
also involved many aspects of Islam 
and the Muslim culture because the 
crime occurred and was tried to a 
certain extent with a foreign religious 
aspect. 
 The murder charge, however, 
was individual, immediate, legally 
familiar and comfortably local, as reflected by the very 
familiar and local evidence presented.  It was a classic law 
enforcement scenario case with a little foreign gloss, and no 
fundamental struggle in court mechanisms to accommodate it.  
This stands in stark contrast with the war scenario tried a few 
blocks away in Federal court. 
 This might explain the tendency seen among federal 
prosecutors to use traditional, non-terrorism related laws to 
address the terrorism phenomenon, and a reluctance to use the 
so-called terrorism statutes utilized in the foregoing case and 
otherwise available nationally. 
 Let us return to the role of the litigator as teacher.  Of 
course, before one can teach something, he or she must learn it 
well.  Given the localized structure of prosecutor offices 
nationwide, and particularly that of the United States Attorney 
Office system, and the random, geographic manifestation of 
terrorism, especially the material support aspect thereof, the 
learning of any given prosecutor tasked with terrorism 
litigation starts at square one.  Each has to largely invent the 
wheel with every jurisdictional terrorism manifestation, 
detracting from the efficiency and the efficacy that can only 
come with mastering the material.  Therein lies the 
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impediment: an absence of mentoring.  Due to the institutional 
structure of the local law enforcement scenario, it is extremely 
difficult to coordinate the sharing of information and 
experiences, even when that sharing opportunity is created 
administratively.  Everyone has his or her own local, 
constantly pressing demands.  As expressed by one very 
capable FBI agent: “Even when you get together and share 
information, you can’t readily share the experience of living 
and breathing something for a number of years.”  Although the 
Department of Justice has an excellent and capable Counter-
Terrorism Section for oversight and coordination and a 
marvelous National Advocacy Center for training, the 
localized administrative structure of State and Federal 
prosecutors makes it difficult at best to achieve the true 
mentoring purpose of those institutional components. 
 The officers and agents responsible for investigating 
terrorism are subject to the same localized crime scenario 
impediment.  Like their prosecutor counterparts, they are 
stationed locally to deal with local crime.  When the fickle 
finger of terrorism fate randomly points at them, they must 
gain a mastery of the material in relative isolation because of 
similar administrative structure.  Indeed it is fate that 
determines whether or not that local FBI office or even region 
will have the personnel most indicated by their personalities 
and experience to meet the severe, extra-territorial demands of 
a terrorism investigation.  Even with coordinating components 
at FBI headquarters, for the reasons previously mentioned, 
significant mentoring is difficult. 
 It is possible that we are perplexed and frustrated in 
our terrorism war scenario endeavor, burdened with ill-suited 
statutes and problematic constitutional norms. 
 We might be further hindered procedurally with very 
local investigators investigating very foreign facts; with very 
local prosecutors teaching very foreign facts; and with very 
local juries judging very foreign facts. 
 So what are the solutions? For now, the problems are 
more often posed than solved.   
 There is a need, however, for statutes that better 
reflect and address the terrorism reality.  These statutes 
necessitate a more straightforward and pertinent definition of 
the proscription, particularly with regard to material support, 
and what is required to prove it. Generally speaking, there 
must be a statutory transition from the law enforcement 
scenario to the war scenario in the terrorism field. 
 Furthermore, there is obviously much need for 
greater study of and discussion concerning the operational 
relationship between the military and the criminal justice 
address of terrorism. Although courts and scholars have begun 
addressing this as a result of Guantanamo Bay and 
immigration detentions, more attention and precision are 
needed.  The activity of the criminal justice system in the war 
scenario is necessarily limited.   
 Nonetheless, that system must do its part in 
addressing the phenomenon.  At the same time, we have to 
better understand where the one ends and the other begins.  
This is meaningful not only for prosecutors, but especially for 
law enforcement agents.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, the lesson gleaned as a result of this 
personal odyssey from Mayberry to the two Moscows of Idaho 
and Russia is that scholars and litigators alike must be 
increasingly aware of the social condition of the criminal 
justice system and ever vigilant as to the competition between 
law enforcement and war systems.  Each must work diligently 
in identifying, developing and applying legitimate criminal 
justice tools to modern events without succumbing to or 
invading the province of militarism; and, at the same time, 
trust that the military counterpart is providing an equally and 
accommodating clarity to this paradigm. 
 
*Kim R. Lindquist is an Assistant United States Attorney for 
the District of Idaho, and has been for 18 years. He is 
currently assigned international and domestic terrorism 
responsibilities with the United States Department of Justice. 
Before joining the Department of Justice, he was in private 
practice for eight years, specializing in criminal defense work.  
This article is condensed from a speech given by him at the 
INTELCON National Intelligence Conference and Exposition 
at Arlington, Virginia, on February 9, 2005.  
 
